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ABSTRACT 
The paper investigates whether multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in Portugal 
and Greece perform differently than domestic firms using two samples. The first contains 
2651 and the second 523 firms operating in Greece in 1997 and Portugal in 1992 
respectively. Departures from normality of firms' profitability motivated the adoption of 
the robust technique of quantile regression. The estimation results suggest that 
ownership ties do not make a significant difference with respect to performance of firms 
operating in Portugal. Results were similar for firms operating in Greece and only when 
firms in the upper quantiles of gross profits were compared, MNCs were found to 
significantly perform better than domestic firms. It is probably because MNCs have to 
compensate for their liability of foreigness that in spite of their technological advantages 
they cannot persistently outperform their domestic rivals.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The evidence on firms’ performance gathered over the past years appears to challenge the 
conventional homogeneity wisdom that considers the heterogeneity of firms to be a 
temporary phenomenon, which will ultimately be followed by convergence of firms in 
conduct and performance as a result of competition in the same industry.  In a study of 
firms in the US, Mueller (1986) reported long-lived differences in profitability within 
industries,  while studies of firms in the UK (Cubbin and Geroski, 1987) and in several 
other countries (Mueller, 1990) corroborate the earlier findings.  The common observation 
of firms’ persistent heterogeneity within an industry has stimulated several studies 
seeking to identify and describe what factors block the convergence of firms’ conduct and 
performance over time.  After the seminal paper by Demsetz (1973) who pointed out that 
a superior competitive performance might be specific to the firm that has developed a 
differential advantage in producing and marketing its products, further studies identify 
technological, industry-based, historical and organizational considerations as the leading 
factors in firm performance (Röller and Sinclair-Desgagné, 1996).  Firms are 
heterogeneous in terms of efficiency and competitive capabilities, which would reflect on 
their competitive performance. 
The emphasis on firm-specific assets as the main source of firms’ heterogeneity 
with respect to conduct and performance has stimulated many studies that seek to 
investigate whether multinational firms (MNCs), or their subsidiaries, perform better than 
domestically controlled firms.  The international business literature has well established 
that a reason why firms invest abroad is that they possess firm-specific advantages, not 
available to domestic firms in the host country. Such advantages may compensate for the 
costs of doing business abroad relative to domestically-owned firms and, hence, assist 
MNCs to display superior performance (cf., among others, Dunning (1993), Markusen 
(1995), Caves (1996)).  MNCs' advantages may comprise financial advantages, product 
differentiation and marketing advantages, advantages arising from superior governance 
or from the ability to exploit economies of scale (Dunning, 1993, p. 162-163).  The 
Industrial Organization (IO) paradigm applied to MNCs also emphasises the possession of 
"nontangible productive assets, such as technological know-how, marketing and 
managing skills, export contacts, coordinated relationships with suppliers and 
customers, and reputation" (Aitken and Harrison, 1999, p. 606-607) as competitive 
advantages that can be transferred across space and enable MNCs to successfully 
compete with firms that know the modus operandi of local markets.  Empirical results 
have largely been interpreted in the light of the firm-specific advantages argument.  
Nonetheless, previous empirical evidence on MNCs performance compared with 
domestically owned firms is somewhat ambiguous, though it tends to suggest on balance 
that foreign ownership impacts positively on firms’ performance. 
Studies of firms operating in developing countries, Lecraw (1984), Willmore 
(1986), and Majumdar (1997) conclude that ownership ties do make a difference with 
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respect to firms’ performance.  Firms with foreign ownership out-perform domestically 
owned firms with similar characteristics.  Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) extend the 
study of Indian industry by including foreign control considerations and reinforce the 
previous finding; MNCs display relatively superior performance.  This conclusion of MNCs 
superior performance is generally achieved for developed countries (cf. Caves, 1996; 
Boardman et al., 1997).  On the other hand, Globerman et al. (1994) report that once the 
effects of capital intensity and size are controlled for, MNCs operating in the Canadian 
market are not significantly more productive than Canadian-owned firms, emphasising 
that the superior performance of MNCs is primarily due to the high capital intensity and 
large size that generally characterise them.  Kim and Lyn (1990), in turn, found that 
MNCs operating in the U.S. market are less profitable than randomly selected 
domestically owned firms. 
Portugal and Greece present particularly interesting cases for building upon 
earlier empirical evidence on the relative superior performance of MNCs and testing   the 
relationship between ownership and the reported performance.  They are both developed 
countries but, in the context of the European Union (EU), they are small, peripheral 
economies attracting MNCs that may have reasons for investing in these countries 
distinct from those investing in other European countries.  Moreover, EU membership 
and the creation of the Single Market triggered a wave of FDI in Europe, with Portugal 
and Greece being important receptors of FDI. The topic under scrutiny is, therefore, to 
investigate whether MNCs operating in Portugal and Greece perform differently than 
domestically owned firms.  In particular, we seek to identify the relevant factors that may 
explain the performance implications of foreign ownership for a large cross section of 
firms in Portuguese and Greek industries, controlling for a number of factors affecting 
firms’ performance.  A closely related topic is to examine whether MNCs perform well per 
se, or their relative superior performance is a consequence of the detrimental effect they 
may exercise on domestic profitability.  
The paper is organised as follows.  In the next section the literature on firms’ 
performance is briefly reviewed in order to establish the model of performance that forms 
the basis of the empirical application.  A discussion of the data and variables used in the 
study is made in Section 3.  The next section presents the appropriate econometric 
methodology, while Section 5 reports and discusses estimation results that intend to 
provide answers for the research questions stated earlier.  The paper ends by reviewing 
the main conclusions and evaluating policy implications towards FDI. 
2 A MODEL OF PERFORMANCE 
Before discussing the main determinants of corporate performance, we should briefly 
address the question of how we can measure performance.  Broadly, one can measure 
corporate performance by variables relating to productivity, profitability, growth or, even, 
customers’ satisfaction.  These measures tend to be related, as firms with greater 
productivity are more likely to have greater profitability and to experience large rates of 
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growth.  Nonetheless, they are far from being perfectly correlated (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000) and one has to choose the most appropriate measure to accomplish the 
research objectives.  On the other hand, the choice of the performance measure to be 
used merely depends on whether it is asserted that firms pursue maximum profits, 
productivity levels or customer’s satisfaction.  In line with the standard wisdom in IO, we 
assume profit-maximising firms and, accordingly, we measure their performance by 
variables relating to profitability. 
Differences in profitability across firms can be related to differences in firm-
specific advantages, such as proprietary technology and managerial expertise, as well as 
to differences in industry’s characteristics where firms operate.  The importance of 
industry- and firm-specific characteristics in determining profitability is well established, 
although the relative importance of these two groups of factors is not consensual.  
Whereas Schmalensee (1985) argues that industry characteristics account for a 
significant percentage of the variation in industry average profitability, Cubbin and 
Geroski (1987) report that industry effects do not contribute significantly to changes in 
U.K. firms’ profitability.  Instead, they find that there are important firm-specific dynamic 
effects.  Other studies like those by Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) and by Rumelt (1991) 
also reveal that industry effects play a relatively modest role in explaining the variability 
of observed profitability when compared to firm-specific effects. Thus, a model of 
profitability should include both sources.  Note that evaluating differences in profitability 
due to foreign ownership mainly implies the analysis of firm-specific effects.  
Accordingly, we specify that profits of a firm i operating in industry j (πij) have 
additively separable components of the form: 
ijijijij FDI ε+α++=π γβ zx ,  (1) 
where xj is a vector comprising observable industry-specific characteristics, zi a vector of 
observable firm-specific characteristics, which reflects firms’ distinct capabilities that 
provide the basis for their competitive advantages, and εij an unobservable firm- and 
industry-specific term.  β and γ are vectors of unknown parameters.  This formulation 
goes somewhat further than the standard IO wisdom, which identifies industry structure 
as the chief determinant of profitability, by considering firms’ conduct with respect to the 
development of firm-specific assets often being associated with superior performance.  
However, the linkage between structure, conduct and performance is only informally 
established.  The main goal is, after properly controlling for firm- and industry-specific 
characteristics that are likely to impact on firms’ performance, to evaluate if there remain 
any significant differences in profitability that can be attributed to foreign ownership.  
The effect of foreign ownership, if any, will be, therefore, captured by the qualitative 
variable FDI, which is specified as a separate component of firms’ profitability.   
A number of industry's characteristics are expected to affect firms' ability to attain 
above-average levels of profitability as they reflect the competitive environment firms face.  
In analysing inter-industry differences in performance, industry concentration (CR4) and 
industry growth (GROWTH) are the leading factors that are likely to impact on firms' 
 5
profitability.  Two types of arguments can be made about the effect of the degree of 
competition on profitability.  Following the standard IO wisdom, industry concentration 
facilitates collusion and, in highly concentrated industries, firms can exercise monopoly 
power leading to large profits.  Further, in these industries incumbents are more likely to 
retaliate against entrants (Bunch and Smiley, 1992), preventing outside competition from 
exerting a disciplinary effect in driving profits to their normal level and agency problems 
may be less severe (Nickel et al., 1997).  The available evidence relating firms' 
performance to industry concentration suggests mainly a positive relationship between 
concentration and profitability (Hay and Morris, 1991), even though Schmalensee (1989) 
argues that “a researcher cannot expect a strong, positive concentration-profitability 
relation to leap out from cross-section data” (p. 976). 
Another element of competitive environment that may impact on profitability is 
industry growth.  One of the stylised facts established by Schmalensee (1989, p. 972) is 
that profits are in general larger in growing than otherwise identical industries.  This is 
consistent with the view that profit-maximising firms may take any increase in demand 
as profit opportunities in the form of larger profits instead of, for instance, faster growth.  
In a period of demand growth firms may experience difficulties to immediately respond by 
increasing their output and, therefore, an excess demand is likely to arise, leading to 
increases in prices and profits.  For instance, Bradburd and Caves (1982) find empirical 
support for the hypothesis of a positive relationship between growth and profitability, but 
less so in concentrated industries. 
Inter-industry differentials in firms’ performance may also be explained by 
differentials on R&D expenditures (R&D).  Grabowki and Mueller (1978) and Kim and Lyn 
(1990) provide evidence that firms operating in research-intensive industries tend to 
obtain above-average profits, suggesting the formation of rent-yielding assets.  More 
recently Hanel and St-Pierre (2002) do not reject the hypothesis that R&D impacts 
positively on profitability, even though the contribution to profits depends on firms’ 
capability to appropriate the results of R&D activities.  This is crucial in the case of 
MNCs as they commonly establish their affiliates in research-intensive industries to 
exploit their own proprietary knowledge (Cleeve, 1997).  Therefore, a significant and 
positive relationship between research intensity at industry level and firms’ performance 
would be expected. 
The degree of foreign presence (FSHARE) in an industry may impact on firms’ 
performance, preventing its convergence in the long run.  The effects on firms’ 
performance attributed to MNCs may however operate in divergent directions.  
Notwithstanding the direct effect of MNCs transference of assets on efficiency and 
performance of their affiliates, positive MNC-related spillovers in an industry are expected 
to increase the average performance of firms.  Blomström and Kokko (1998) establish 
theoretically the linkage between technology spillovers, technical efficiency of domestic 
firms and their effect on firms’ performance, while Barrel and Pain (1993), Blomström 
and Sjöholm (1998), and Dimelis and Louri (2002) find evidence that suggests a positive 
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effect of the degree of foreign penetration in an industry on productive efficiency, which 
should render performance higher.  The foreign presence in an industry, on the other 
hand, is likely to affect competitive conditions.  Overall, economic theory posits that 
foreign presence tends to be neutral or to enhance the intensity of competition, leading to 
a decrease in profit margins.  Therefore, the effect of the degree of foreign presence on 
firms’ performance depends on the relative weight of these two opposite forces at work. 
Within an industry, firms’ strategic choices, which delineate firm-specific 
characteristics, are likely to affect performance.  The literature on entry has emphasised 
firm size as a strategic choice that is mainly driven by potential incumbents’ aggressive 
behaviour towards newcomers (Gelman and Salop, 1983; Scherer and Ross, 1990), 
uncertainty about their own efficiency (Jovanovic, 1982) and survival (Cabral, 1995), and 
financial constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989).  These different explanations usually 
support small entry sizes, though small size does not imply superior performance.  The 
theory is ambiguous on the precise relationship between size and performance, but there 
is consensus that firm size (SIZE) impacts on firm-level performance.  Large firms may 
generate superior performance as they are more prone to exploit economies of scale and 
scope and they may organize their activities more efficiently (Majumdar, 1997).  On the 
other hand, monitoring costs, increased bureaucratisation and extensive hierarchies may 
prevent large firms from achieving higher performance.  Small firms may be able to 
compensate their cost differentials by adopting more flexible managerial organizations 
and methods of production (Audretsch and Yamawaki, 1992), responding more rapidly to 
changes on competitive environment and obtaining larger than average profits.  These 
arguments may be less appealing in the case of MNCs than in the case of domestically 
owned firms as MNCs are normally large firms, but are critical when comparing domestic 
and foreign firms.  Finally, the correlation between firm size and market power, reported 
elsewhere, reinforces the specification of SIZE as an explanatory variable of firms’ 
performance. 
The impact of firm’s age (AGE) on performance is expected to be significant, 
though the direction of the effect has not yet been unequivocally established in 
performance literature.  During their early infancy, firms go through a learning process 
about their abilities to operate in the industry (Jovanovic, 1982) or through a developing 
process of new organizational capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Comparatively, 
older firms enjoy the benefits of their previous learning process and can, therefore, obtain 
superior performance.  However, they “are prone to inertia, and the bureaucratic 
ossification that goes along with age” (Majumdar, 1997, p. 233), that may make firms ill 
suited to cope with changes in their competitive environment, leading to negative 
performance.  Although the learning process is not industry-specific and MNCs could 
benefit from past experience of their parent company, they are also subject to some sort 
of learning process to the extent that they are operating in an unfamiliar environment 
and they are locally competing with more informed domestic firms.  All of these 
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arguments make age relevant in explaining differentials in firms’ performance, regardless 
of their (domestic or foreign) origin. 
Finally, firm-specific choices related to financial risk and efficiency in asset 
management may lead to the creation of heterogeneity within industry and may help to 
explain firm performance.  To control for financial risk that can be associated with firm 
dependency and bargaining power in the capital market and may impact on firm 
performance, a measure of debt ratio (DEBT) is added to the set of covariates.  The 
relative ability of firms to convert assets into cash (LIQUIDITY) may also impact on 
performance as resources can quickly be used to respond to profit opportunities.  The 
variables INVENTORY, which is measured as a ratio between inventory value and total 
assets, and TURNOVER, which is measured as a ratio between sales and total assets, 
may capture aspects of firm-level competencies to efficiently manage assets in order to 
maximize their rent-yielding power. 
3 DATA SET, DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 The Data 
The data sets used in this paper were drawn from several sources.  In the Portuguese 
case, most of individual firm information was collected by the Bank of Portugal that 
studies a random sample of firms on an annual basis.  This data source provides mostly 
financial data based on the accounts of firms but lacks information on firms’ ownership 
structure.  To include such information on our data set, we had to combine the Bank of 
Portugal data with other sources.  In particular, data on foreign ownership has been 
derived from Quadros de Pessoal, a data set produced by the Portuguese Ministry of 
Labour and based on a standardized questionnaire that all firms with wage earners must 
answer every year. The final sample includes 523 manufacturing firms operating in 
Portugal in 1992.1   
In the Greek case, individual firm information has been derived from the ICAP 
directory, which provides financial data based on the published accounts of all Plc. and 
Ltd. firms in Greece combined with relevant information from other sources. The data 
refer to 1997 but only firms alive in 1992 as well are included so that we can have growth 
measures. Thus, 2651 firms are used, most of them large-sized, producing more than 
three quarters of manufacturing sales in 1997.2 
3.2 The dependent variables 
Table 1 presents a summary of the descriptive and testing statistics of two alternative 
dependent variables.  For each sample, we use a net and gross measure of return on 
                                              
1 As both sources do not reveal the real identification of firms, the matching of these two data sources requires the 
definition of some identification criteria.  We use information on main economic activity performed, number of 
employees, and location as the matching variables.   
 
2 All Plc. and Ltd. firms in Greece have to publish annual accounts in the press.  ICAP collects the financial data 
reported there and combines it with information derived from additional searches on foreign ownership, location, age 
and employment. Hence our sample includes the population of all manufacturing firms in this category.  
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assets (NROA and GROA, respectively) as a proxy of firms' profitability.  The main 
difference is that taxes and financial costs and revenue are not included in gross 
measures.  The descriptive statistics show that average profitability for firms in our 
sample operating in Portugal is significantly lower than for firms operating in Greece, 
although the relatively high standard deviation implies that there is a larger spread of 
profitability around the mean in Portugal.  The difference in the period of analysis may 
partially explain such difference as the observed years may imply differences over the 
economic cycle. 
Most interestingly, the coefficient for skewness indicates that the distribution of 
firms’ gross profitability (GROA) is slightly skewed to the right in the Greek case, as 
compared to the normal distribution, while in the Portuguese case the skewness is 
negligible.  Conversely, in both cases the distribution of firms’ net profitability (NROA) is 
slightly skewed to the left.  For all cases the coefficient for kurtosis provides evidence that 
the distribution of firms’ profitability departs from normality.  This finding is further 
corroborated by the Shapiro-Francia test for the normality assumption of the marginal 
distribution of firms’ profitability which is rejected at p=0.00, suggesting caution in 
choosing the appropriate econometric treatment to deal with such distribution features.  
In particular, the OLS methodology would not be appropriate for our purposes as the 
non-normality of the dependent variable causes the OLS residuals to be non-Gaussian, 
leading to inefficient or asymptotically inefficient estimators.  On the contrary, quantile 
regression models seem quite appropriate to the analysis of firms’ profitability as they 
provide a robust characterization of the firms’ profitability distribution that does not rest 
on strong distributional assumptions.3 
On the other hand, the t-tests for equality of means show that in Portugal there 
are no considerable differences between domestic- and foreign-owned firms with regard to 
profitability, while in Greece, the average gross profitability of domestic firms is 
significantly lower than the average gross profitability of foreign firms.  This result 
suggests that after controlling for firm- and industry-specific characteristics that are 
likely to impact on firms’ performance, one would not expect any significant difference in 
profitability that can be attributed to foreignness at least in the Portuguese case.  
Moreover, it provides us with preliminary evidence that the similarity in terms of 
performance between foreign- and domestic-firms appears to be country-specific. 
3.3 The explanatory variables 
The choice of explanatory variables or covariates is theoretically driven and aims to proxy 
firm- and industry-specific characteristics that are likely to determine firms’ performance 
regardless of ownership structure. 
In order to proxy industry growth we define the covariate GROWTH as the average 
of annual rate of growth of output in the relevant (3-digit) industry over the past 3 years 
in the Portuguese case and over the past 5 years in the Greek case.  Industry 
                                              
3 See Section 4 for a discussion of the estimation of quantile regression models. 
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concentration is another industry-specific characteristic that is measured by the share of 
employees contained in the industry’s four largest firms (CR4).  The intensity of foreign 
firms in the industry (FSHARE) in the Portuguese sample is measured as the ratio of 
employment accounted for foreign firms (regardless of their participation rates) to the 
total number of employees in the relevant industry. In the Greek sample it is measured 
as the share of an industry’s fixed assets accounted for by foreign firms.4  In turn, the 
R&D Intensity (R&D) is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales at industry 
level for the Greek sample, but similar data are not available for Portugal.  Instead, we 
use information on the number of innovating firms per industry to construct a dummy 
variable that aims to proxy R&D intensity.  In particular, we define an industry as R&D 
intensive if the ratio of innovating firms to the total number of firms in an industry is 
greater than the average ratio for the manufacturing industry.  
With reference to firm-specific characteristics (all lagged by one year), we measure 
firm size (SIZE) by the logarithm of the number of employees and firm age (AGE) by the 
number of years a firm is operating in an industry.  In order to proxy financial risk we 
define the covariate DEBT as the ratio of short and long term debt to total assets and the 
covariate LIQUIDITY as the ratio of working capital to total assets.  On the other hand, 
firm-level operational competencies are proxied by the covariates INVENTORY and 
TURNOVER, which are measured as the ratio between inventory value to total assets and 
sales to total assets, respectively.  Additionally, we use physical capital as reported by the 
firm (capital stock) and compute the logarithm of the ratio of capital to number of 
employees in order to obtain the average of capital per employee, which is a proxy to 
physical capital intensity (K/L). In order to answer our main research question, we define 
the covariate foreign ownership (FDI) that takes the value 1 if the firm has a foreign 
participation greater than 10%5, which allows us to evaluate if there are any significant 
differences in profitability due exclusively to foreigness. 
Aside differences on performance, the descriptive statistics of the independent 
variables reported in Table 2 show that foreign firms operate in industries with a higher 
degree of foreign presence, suggesting that they seek to take advantage of some sort of 
externalities due to the presence of MNCs.  In the Greek sample, we find also that the 
difference in the means of industry growth is significant, as indicated by the t-statistic 
that leads us to reject the hypothesis of equality of means between foreign and domestic 
firms at p-value of 0.05.  The average growth of industries where domestic firms operate 
is smaller than the average growth of industries where foreign firms operate.  This 
suggests that comparatively, foreign firms tend to choose industries with high rate of 
growth as a device to explore profit opportunities.  No similar evidence is found in the 
Portuguese sample.  Nonetheless, in the Portuguese sample we found that foreign firms 
operate in relatively more concentrated and R&D-intensive industries.  This appears to 
                                              
4 Use of employment data as in the Portuguese case provided similar results. 
5 Following the usual threshold used by national statistical agencies to determine whether a firm is foreign or domestic 
based on the effective exercise of corporate control, we consider as foreign firms all firms that have at least 10% of 
foreign participation. 
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indicate that foreign firms expect to obtain large profits by exercising monopoly power 
that is considerably easier in concentrated industries.   
When analysing firm-specific characteristics in both samples, it becomes 
noticeable that foreign and domestic firms have similar preferences with respect to 
financial risk and efficiency in asset management. Based on the t-tests performed to 
assess the hypothesis of equality of means between foreign and domestic firms, we found 
that there are no significant differences in the means of the covariates DEBT, LIQUIDITY, 
INVENTORY, and TURNOVER.  Conversely, the statistics reported in Table 2 show that, 
on average, capital-intensity and size of foreign firms significantly exceed the respective 
means of domestic firms.  Moreover, we find a preference of foreign firms for larger size 
and more capital per employee, which may contribute to a positive differential in 
performance.  It is also worth noting that foreign firms in our samples are, on average, 
older than domestic firms, suggesting that previous learning process about their abilities 
to operate in the industry may lead to superior performance. 
4 ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
Let Qq(π|c) for q ∈ (0,1) denote the qth quantile of the conditional distribution of firms’ 
profitability (π), given the known vector, c=(x, z, FDI), of covariates discussed above.  The 
conditional quantile distribution provides a full characterization of the conditional firms’ 
profitability.  As q is increased from 0 to 1, the entire distribution of π is traced, 
conditional on c.  By modelling the conditional quantiles with the identity link function, 
i.e. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )FDIQ qqiqjijijq α+′+′=π γzβxc ,  
the parameters of (1) can be estimated at various quantiles of the conditional distribution 
of π, allowing the effects of the covariates to differ at different points of the distribution 
and, thus, it may show whether a covariate exerts a significant influence on one tail of 
the distribution but not on the other. 
The quantile regression (QR) coefficients, β(q), γ(q) and α(q), for given q ∈ (0,1) can be 
estimated by the methods introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978).  They define the qth 
regression quantile as the solution to the problem 
ij
i
iijij
i
ij FDI hhmin,, ∑ α−′−′−π=∑ εα γzβx jγβ  (2) 
with,  
( )

<ε−
>ε=
0if12
0if2
ij
ij
ij q
q
h . 
Note that quantiles other than the median are estimated by weighting the residuals.  The 
positive or negative nature of the residuals determines their appropriate weights.  
Estimation was performed using the SQREG procedure in STATA and 1000 replications 
were performed to estimate the entire variance-covariance matrix of the estimators by 
bootstrap resampling.  The practical advantage of this procedure is that one can perform 
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hypothesis tests concerning coefficients within and across quantiles.  The relevance of 
the bootstrapping procedure hinges on its robustness property; in particular when the 
errors from the QR equation are not homogeneously distributed.  The Pseudo R2 for each 
quantile is calculated as 
q
q
W
W1 ~
ˆ−  where qWˆ  is the sum of weighted deviations about 
estimated quantiles and qW
~
the sum of weighted deviations about raw quantiles, i.e. 
quantile regression on a constant only. 
5 RESULTS 
Empirical results for selected quantiles from estimating the QR model are given in Tables 
3 and 4.  For comparison purposes, we also provide the estimates obtained from the OLS 
model.  The OLS results show that our empirical model of profitability explains more 
than 25 % of the observed profit variability for firms operating in Portugal and the model 
goodness-of-fit for firms operating in Greece is between 16% and 48%.  Interestingly the 
model offers a better fit for the net measure of profitability in the Portuguese case, while 
in the Greek case, the goodness-of-fit substantially increases when we use the gross 
measure of profits.  Nonetheless, in both samples industry characteristics account for a 
small percentage of the variation in firms' profitability.  When we regress profitability on 
firm-specific covariates only, the R2 is very close to the overall R2, indicating that firm-
specific characteristics play a chief role in explaining the variability of observed 
profitability.   
The Shapiro-Francia test applied to the OLS residuals, however, confirms the 
inadequacy of the OLS methodology to analyse the conditional distribution of corporate 
profitability.  The hypothesis of normality of the residuals is rejected at p=0.00, rendering 
OLS estimators inefficient.  This result is not surprising as we have already found 
evidence that the marginal distribution (see Section 3.2) departs from normality.  It 
should be noted, nonetheless, that overall, the covariates that are statistically significant 
in explaining profitability remain mostly unchanged, indicating that the significance of 
the covariates on the conditional mean of the dependent variable is similar to that at the 
selected quantiles of the conditional distribution, though their effects are considerably 
different.  The discussion of the estimated results is therefore focused on quantile 
regression results. 
Overall the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the effects of most of 
the significant covariates differ among the selected quantiles, reinforcing the adoption of 
the quantile regression methodology.  In particular, the coefficient of our main covariate 
(FDI) varies considerably, either in terms of size and significance, as we move from OLS to 
quantile regression and among the selected quantiles of the profitability conditional 
distribution.  In the Portuguese case we find evidence that does not support our a priori 
expectation with respect to the relationship between foreign ownership and profitability, 
casting doubts on the hypothesis that MNCs perform better than domestic firms.  If there 
 12
is any difference, it appears to favour Portuguese domestic firms that seem to perform 
better than MNCs operating in Portugal.  This relative superior performance is 
particularly evident when we concentrate our attention on the gross measure of 
profitability and on firms are at the lower quantiles (0.10 and 0.25).  Note, however, that 
significant differences among the regression coefficients are only reported for those 
quantiles (see Table 5).  When we consider the net measure of profitability there is also 
no support for the hypothesis that after controlling for firm- and industry-specific 
characteristics that are likely to determine firms’ performance, there remains a 
differential in profitability that can only be associated to foreign ownership.  Yet, the 
effect of FDI on firms belonging to the lower quantiles appears to differ.  As we move from 
the lower quantile to the upper quantile, the estimated effect of foreign ownership on 
profitability increases, suggesting that ownership matters as firms attain high profits 
levels but not significantly. 
Conversely, the Greek sample offers evidence that there may be profitability 
differentials that could be attributed to foreignness.  In particular, we find that the 
coefficient of FDI varies significantly from 0.005 to 0.181 as we move from the lower 
quantile (0.10) to the upper quantile (0.90) of the gross profitability conditional 
distribution.  More interestingly, the most profitable foreign firms, i.e. firms at the upper 
quantiles (0.75 and 0.90), report positive differentials on profitability that are statistically 
significant and can only be associated to foreignness, confirming our a priori 
expectations.  This suggests that the effect of foreignness on profitability is strengthened 
towards the right tails of the distribution, as is confirmed by the tests performed for the 
stability of the regression coefficients at selected quantiles (see Table 6).  The effect of 
foreign ownership across the net profitability conditional distribution is similar to that 
found in the Portuguese sample; that is, an increasing effect of foreign ownership on 
firms' profitability, despite its statistical insignificance.  Overall, the hypothesis of relative 
superior performance of MNCs is only partially supported by our descriptive evidence, 
suggesting that country-specific factors may also be at work preventing us to find 
regularities across the observed economies. 
The effect of the degree of foreign presence (FSHARE) on corporate profitability, on 
the other hand, provides similar evidence across the observed manufacturing industries.  
The covariate is statistically insignificant in explaining profitability, irrespective of the 
empirical measure, the sample and, the econometric methodology applied.  This result 
appears to indicate that the intensity of foreign presence in an industry is neutral to 
competition with no impact on margins.  An alternative interpretation is that the pro-
competitive effect may be entirely compensated by positive MNC-related spillovers, 
rendering the overall effect on firms' profitability insignificant.  In order to investigate 
whether this effect differs by type of ownership we re-estimate the model for both samples 
adding interaction covariates such as FDI*FSHARE to the set of covariates.6  Neither 
                                              
6 The estimation results of the models of performance with interaction covariates are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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FSHARE nor FDI*FSHARE is ever statistically significant, indicating that if MNCs reveal 
relative superior performance, it cannot be explained as a consequence of a damaging 
effect on domestic profitability.  MNCs may perform well due to their own specific 
characteristics and capabilities to compete in an industry.  Moreover, the statistically 
insignificant effect of FSHARE on domestic and foreign firms’ performance suggests that, 
if anything, the FDI enhancing efficiency effect is spread out to all firms operating in an 
industry.  Consequently, this effect would hardly explain differentials in performance. 
Industry-specific characteristics (GROWTH, R&D and, CR4) offer us evidence of 
different effects among the observed firms.  Firms operating in Greece are sensitive to 
industry growth, R&D intensity and degree of concentration, while firms operating in 
Portugal appear to reveal that industry characteristics do not matter for profitability.  
Moreover, the positive and significant effect of the degree of concentration found in the 
Greek sample peaks towards the median slightly increasing its size but maintaining its 
significance level.  We interpret this result as evidence that firms are more likely to 
protect their market positions against rivals' competition if their profitability is median or 
higher.  A different picture is offered by the industry growth and R&D intensity 
coefficients, indicating that they are important enhancing profitability factors but for all 
firms, regardless of their profits level and ownership structure. 
In terms of firm-specific attributes, we find evidence that large firms operating in 
Greece perform better than small firms, regardless of their profitability level and 
performance measure.  Moreover, the magnitude of SIZE effect on firms' profitability is 
identical across firms.  This suggests that monitoring costs and potential increased 
bureaucratisation may well be compensated for by the advantages of exploiting 
economies of scale and scope that are available to large firms.  The effect of SIZE can also 
be interpreted as indicating firms’ market power and its positive impact on performance.  
This positive relationship may explain MNCs superior performance, as they are larger 
than domestic firms (cf. Table 2).  Conversely, firm size appears to not significantly 
impact on performance of firms operating in Portugal.  Alternatively, we can interpret this 
result as indicating that the advantages of being large are entirely compensated for by the 
disadvantages, resulting in a neutral effect on performance.  However, we should note 
that when the NROA measure is used large size appears to result in low performance, 
particularly for firms at the upper quantiles of the profitability distribution.   
On the other hand, firms' age does not impact significantly on profitability.  
Nevertheless, when a net measure of profitability is used, firms operating in Greece and 
with a profit level around the median of the profitability conditional distribution do not 
appear to benefit from age.  Old firms seem to perform worse than young ones, 
suggesting that the benefits of a previous learning process may not compensate for the 
organizational stumbling blocks that may come along with age. 
In agreement with our a priori expectations, the results show that the ability of 
firms to convert assets into cash is an important enhancing profitability factor.  Both 
samples provide evidence that the covariate LIQUIDITY is strongly significant in 
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explaining differentials in profitability.  There are, nonetheless, no significant differences 
across the selected quantiles of the profitability distribution for firms operating in 
Portugal (see Table 5).  That is, the ability to quickly convert assets into cash in response 
to profit opportunities seems to be equally spread out to all firms.  Conversely, firms 
operating in Greece seem to be dissimilar in terms of such ability.  Firms with a median 
level of profits appear to have a higher capacity to respond to profit opportunities by 
converting assets into cash.  They appear, on the other hand, to be more susceptible to 
financial risk, which impacts negatively on profitability.  The negative effect of DEBT 
increases towards the median of the conditional profitability distribution, decreasing 
afterwards.  However, when we use a net measure of profits, the concave configuration of 
the DEBT effect is not confirmed.  On the contrary, we find evidence of a negative and 
increasing effect as we move from the lower to the upper quantile, suggesting that firms' 
dependency on the capital market may increase with their profit levels as in order to 
respond to profit opportunities external funds may be required. It should be noted, 
however, that a similar effect can not be found in the Portuguese sample.  The DEBT 
effect decreases as firms’ profitability increases, suggesting that firms operating in 
Portugal may respond to profit opportunities using their own surplus of funds, which is 
more likely to be available in firms with high levels of profits. 
With respect to firm-level competencies in assets management, we find strong 
evidence of a positive and increasing impact on firms’ profitability as the effect of the 
covariate TURNOVER increases as we move towards the right tail of the profitability 
conditional distribution.  This result suggests that high profit levels may be partially 
explained by the ability of firms to take full advantage of their assets rent-yielding power, 
the finding being not county-specific.  Conversely, the way firms manage their inventories 
and its impact on profitability is a contrasting finding between the two samples.  Whereas 
firms operating in Portugal appear to choose high levels of inventories as a way to 
increase profits, for firms operating in Greece high level of inventories impact negatively 
on profitability.  Nonetheless, in both cases the INVENTORY effect decreases as firms 
attain high profits, indicating that the relative relevance of inventory decisions falls as 
firms increase their performance. 
Another contrasting finding is related to the effect of physical capital intensity 
(K/L) on firms’ profitability.  Whereas firms operating in Portugal appear to improve their 
performance if they choose a capital-intensive technology, firms operating in Greece are 
more prone to choose a labour intensive technology as a way to improve performance.  
This suggests that capital costs in Greece may be a relevant constraint that prevents 
firms from increasing profitability, irrespective of whether we use a gross or net measure 
of profitability.  Moreover, this effect appears not to be mitigated as firms move across the 
probability distribution, as there are no significant differences among firms at different 
quantiles of the conditional distribution.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The aim of our study was to identify performance variables and most importantly, to 
examine specifically the role of FDI both as a shift variable and as an industry variable 
measuring technology spillovers using two separate, country-specific samples of 
manufacturing firms. For this purpose, a sample of 2651 Greek firms in 1997 and a 
sample of 523 Portuguese firms in 1992 were constructed. Departures from normality of 
firms' profitability motivated the adoption of the robust technique of quantile regression, 
which to our knowledge had not been used previously in relevant studies. It should also 
be stressed that to date, there were no published performance studies for either country. 
The estimation results suggest that, after controlling for firm-and industry-
specific characteristics that are likely to impact on performance, ownership ties do not 
make a significant difference for firms in Portugal, subsequently casting doubts on the 
hypothesis that MNCs perform better than domestic firms, probably because they have to 
compensate for their liability of foreigness.  Conversely, MNCs operating in Greece are 
significantly more profitable than Greek-owned firms, if a specific measure of profitability 
(gross return on assets) is taken into account and in particular when firms in the upper 
quantiles are compared. In both countries the intensity of foreign presence in an industry 
appears to be neutral to competition with no impact on margins. Hence, if MNCs reveal a 
superior relative performance, it cannot be attributed to a damaging effect on domestic 
profitability possibly imposed by tough competition. 
Firms operating in Greece are found to be sensitive to industry characteristics, 
such as concentration, R&D intensity and growth, which is not true for Portuguese firms. 
Another difference between firms in the two countries is the effect of size being positively 
significant in Greece and non-significant in Portugal, while capital intensity appears to 
worsen and improve performance respectively. Still, a notable similarity is the effect of 
liquidity or the ability to convert assets into cash to explore profitable opportunities, 
while the effect of debt is found to play a negative role. Most of these effects vary by 
quantile. 
One interesting extension of our research would be to examine the impact on 
performance according to the extent of foreign ownership, and specifically whether 
differences are observed between majority- and minority-held foreign firms and whether 
such considerations affect the nature of spillovers. Another potentially fruitful extension 
would be to include more countries in the analysis, allowing the recognition of country-
specific effects and thereby contributing to a better understanding of the conditions 
under which foreign ownership may affect performance. 
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Table 1: Descriptive and testing statistics of the dependent variables 
 Portugal  Greece 
 All firms Domestic Foreign  All firms Domestic Foreign 
Variable: GROA        
Sample 523(100%) 476(91%) 47(9%)  
2651(100
%) 
2498(94
%) 
153(6%
) 
Mean 0.0459 0.0449 0.0558  0.2560 0.2494 0.3627 
S.D 0.0919 0.0901 0.1093  0.2413 0.2319 0.3455 
Skewness -0.5906 -0.5737 -0.760  4.3340 4.6220 2.2690 
Kurtosis 13.0684 13.8523 8.4125  42.115 49.698 7.077 
Shapiro-Francia test 8.542 8.427 4.052  7.426 7.692 6.584 
t-test for Equality of 
Means a)  
-0.7736 
(0.4395)   
-3.9994 
(0.0001) 
        
Variable: NROA        
Sample 523(100%) 476(91%) 47(9%)  
2651(100
%) 
2498(94
%) 
153(6%
) 
Mean 0.0062 0.0056 0.0128  0.0474 0.0465 0.0612 
S.D 0.0768 0.0746 0.0973  0.1060 0.1044 0.1291 
Skewness -2.130 -2.417 -0.740  -1.716 -1.969 0.439 
Kurtosis 15.664 17.2878 7.4318  32.349 35.994 2.666 
Shapiro-Francia test 9.306 9.280 3.799  7.175 7.449 4.317 
t-test for Equality of 
Meansa)  
-0.6144 
(0.5392)   
-1.3782 
(0.1700) 
a) The values in parentheses are the p-values for the t-tests 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables by type of ownership 
 PORTUGAL  GREECE 
 Domestic  Foreign  Domestic  Foreign 
Variables Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev. 
GROWTH 0.005 0.029  -0.004 0.039  0.569 0.326  0.677* 0.327 
R&D 0.170 0.376  0.383* 0.491  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.001 
CR4 0.075 0.053  0.107* 0.089  0.677 0.197  0.656 0.209 
FSHARE 0.078 0.086  0.144* 0.141  0.205 0.173  0.316* 0.193 
SIZE 3.763 1.141  5.216* 1.351  3.594 0.990  4.839* 1.153 
AGE 21.138 16.611  27.447* 20.000  17.002 16.204  22.928* 16.287 
DEBT 0.406 0.227  0.351 0.0218  0.570 0.258  0.591 0.214 
LIQUIDITY 0.286 0.172  0.261 0.150  0.378 0.198  0.439 0.179 
INVENTORY 0.226 0.181  0.218 0.150  0.211 0.159  0.187 0.113 
TURNOVER 1.657 1.073  1.240 0.667  1.134 0.776  1.235 0.656 
K/L 6.851 1.365  7.976* 1.182  3.762 0.532  3.976* 0.459 
            
Legend: * indicates that the hypothesis of equality of independent variable means between foreign and 
domestic firms is rejected at p ≤ 0.05.  
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Table 3: Quantile Regression Estimates of firms’ performance operating in Portugal 
Dependent variable: GROA 
Sample: 523 firms  
Dependent variable: NROA 
Sample: 523 firms 
  Quantile Regression Estimates   Quantile Regression Estimates 
Variables 
OLS 
Estimates  0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90  
OLS 
Estimates  0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Constant -0.230*** 
(-4.500)  
-0.306*** 
(-4.205) 
-0.183*** 
(-3.348) 
-0.175*** 
(-4.262) 
-0.184*** 
(-3.427) 
-0.199*** 
(-3.105)  
-0.093** 
(-2.110)  
-0.247*** 
(-3.943) 
-0.119** 
(-2.463) 
-0.030 
(-1.290) 
0.011 
(0.377) 
-0.009 
(-0.217) 
GROWTH 0.077 
(0.583)  
0.547** 
(2.501) 
0.125 
(0.851) 
0.053 
(0.493) 
-0.026 
(-0.167) 
0.061 
(0.331)  
-0.009 
(-0.082)  
0.216 
(1.009) 
0.115 
(1.219) 
0.005 
(0.068) 
-0.003 
(-0.038) 
0.108 
(0.971) 
R&D 0.007 
(0.841)  
0.019 
(1.350) 
0.009 
(1.041) 
0.008 
(1.173) 
0.008 
(0.812) 
0.021 
(1.207)  
0.005 
(0.691)  
0.016 
(1.549) 
0.006 
(1.222) 
0.004 
(1.024) 
0.008 
(1.132) 
0.010 
(0.915) 
CR4 -0.130* 
(-1.845)  
-0.106 
(-0.850) 
-0.163* 
(-1.738) 
-0.017 
(-0.242) 
-0.037 
(-0.406) 
-0.046 
(-0.384)  
-0.132** 
(-2.398)  
-0.101 
(-0.878) 
-0.045 
(-0.567) 
-0.049 
(-1.405) 
-0.066* 
(-1.746) 
-0.046 
(-0.659) 
FSHARE 0.026 
(0.499)  
-0.057 
(-0.682) 
0.025 
(0.405) 
0.004 
(0.080) 
0.012 
(0.159) 
0.072 
(0.753)  
0.058 
(1.270)  
-0.048 
(-0.576) 
0.012 
(0.217) 
0.040* 
(1.755) 
0.023 
(0.495) 
0.101 
(1.580) 
SIZE 0.005 
(1.384)  
0.009 
(1.452) 
0.006 
(1.533) 
0.002 
(0.642) 
0.005 
(1.215) 
0.003 
(0.868)  
-0.002 
(-0.660)  
0.006 
(1.089) 
0.0002 
(0.075) 
-0.002 
(-0.913) 
-0.004** 
(-1.843) 
-0.005 
(-1.544) 
AGE -0.0003 
(-1.156)  
-0.001 
(-1.372) 
-0.000 
(-0.108) 
-0.000 
(-0.065) 
-0.000 
(-0.070) 
0.000 
(0.843)  
-0.0002 
(-0.994)  
-0.0005 
(-1.489) 
-0.0001 
(-0.378) 
0.000 
(0.085) 
0.000 
(0.486) 
0.000 
(1.167) 
DEBT -0.111*** 
(-2.973)  
-0.163*** 
(-3.438) 
-0.072*** 
(-2.762) 
-0.056*** 
(-2.966) 
0.040 
(1.285) 
-0.004 
(-0.111)  
-0.179*** 
(-6.880)  
-0.224*** 
(-5.923) 
-0.142*** 
(-4.793) 
-0.070*** 
(-3.953) 
-0.082*** 
(-5.094) 
-0.075*** 
(-3.366) 
LIQUIDITY 0.295*** 
(7.758)  
0.280*** 
(4.344) 
0.225*** 
(4.895) 
0.181*** 
(7.100) 
0.225*** 
(4.597) 
0.252*** 
(6.049)  
0.222*** 
(7.540)  
0.247*** 
(4.405) 
0.179*** 
(4.469) 
0.093*** 
(4.427) 
0.109*** 
(4.636) 
0.119*** 
(3.174) 
INVENTORY 0.140*** 
(3.549)  
0.173*** 
(2.715) 
0.119*** 
(2.958) 
0.112*** 
(4.726) 
0.109*** 
(3.230) 
0.074** 
(2.224)  
0.095*** 
(3.120)  
0.133** 
(2.449) 
0.081*** 
(3.066) 
0.044 
(3.383) 
0.038** 
(2.394) 
0.021 
(0.816) 
TURNOVER 0.012 
(1.478)  
-0.002 
(-0.239) 
-0.000 
(-0.021) 
0.014** 
(2.404) 
0.036*** 
(3.543) 
0.056*** 
(5.229)  
0.002 
(0.400)  
0.001 
(0.081) 
0.002 
(0.349) 
0.006 
(1.624) 
0.010** 
(1.938) 
0.027*** 
(3.424) 
K/L 0.026*** 
(5.229)  
0.031*** 
(4.384) 
0.018*** 
(2.782) 
0.019*** 
(4.760) 
0.017*** 
(3.214) 
0.018*** 
(3.218)  
0.014*** 
(3.159)  
0.026*** 
(4.291) 
0.013*** 
(2.604) 
0.004 
(1.604) 
0.002 
(0.596) 
0.003 
(0.934) 
FDI -0.016 
(-1.082)  
-0.033 
(-1.364) 
-0.026* 
(-1.677) 
-0.004 
(-0.416) 
0.004 
(0.245) 
0.014 
(0.622)  
-0.009 
(-0.675)  
-0.041* 
(-1.671) 
-0.014 
(-0.953) 
-0.000 
(-0.012) 
0.000 
(0.028) 
0.036 
(1.288) 
                
(Pseudo) R2 0.2432  0.2127 0.0980 0.1051 0.1373 0.2442  0.3450  0.3152 0.1261 0.0871 0.1627 0.2523 
Shapiro-Francia test 7.916        7.908       
                
Notes: t-values in parenthesis.  Based on t-values, *,  ** and *** mean that coefficients are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.   
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Table 4: Quantile Regression Estimates of firms’ performance operating in Greece 
Dependent variable: GROA 
Sample: 2651 firms  
Dependent variable: NROA 
Sample: 2561 firms 
  Quantile Regression Estimates   Quantile Regression Estimates 
Variables 
OLS 
Estimates  0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90  
OLS 
Estimates  0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Constant 0.254*** 
(3.570)  
0.106** 
(2.051) 
0.191*** 
(4.776) 
0.207*** 
(5.004) 
0.224*** 
(4.530) 
0.309*** 
(3.753)  
0.224*** 
(2.926)  
0.086** 
(2.079) 
0.059*** 
(3.053) 
0.066*** 
(2.957) 
0.109*** 
(3.617) 
0.162 
(3.958) 
GROWTH 0.077*** 
(6.393)  
0.017* 
(1.878) 
0.041*** 
(3.917) 
0.060*** 
(5.934) 
0.074*** 
(6.941) 
0.083*** 
(4.264)  
0.022** 
(2.897)  
-0.012 
(-1.159) 
0.005 
(1.209) 
0.014** 
(2.432) 
0.032*** 
(3.825) 
0.049*** 
(3.690) 
R&D 5.437*** 
(3.700)  
2.488 
(1.566) 
3.598*** 
(2.698) 
5.037*** 
(3.433) 
3.654** 
(2.151) 
3.041 
(1.210)  
3.460*** 
(3.605)  
2.060 
(1.208) 
0.826 
(1.454) 
1.009 
(1.429) 
4.415*** 
(3.304) 
5.691*** 
(2.786) 
CR4 0.047** 
(2.438)  
0.002 
(0.111) 
0.006 
(0.439) 
0.036*** 
(2.717) 
0.042*** 
(2.768) 
0.038 
(1.613)  
0.016 
(1.562)  
-0.007 
(-0.495) 
0.007 
(1.205) 
0.023*** 
(3.506) 
0.035*** 
(3.523) 
0.069*** 
(4.318) 
FSHARE 0.007 
(0.315)  
0.025 
(1.234) 
0.022 
(1.116) 
0.034** 
(2.208) 
0.023 
(1.332) 
0.002 
(0.070)  
0.014 
(1.110)  
0.019 
(1.108) 
0.004 
(0.510) 
0.011 
(1.358) 
0.001 
(0.057) 
0.031 
(1.415) 
SIZE 0.008** 
(2.224)  
0.006** 
(1.969) 
0.006*** 
(2.805) 
0.009*** 
(3.156) 
0.006* 
(1.857) 
0.010** 
(2.122)  
0.007*** 
(3.665)  
0.011*** 
(3.684) 
0.006*** 
(4.068) 
0.005*** 
(4.238) 
0.008*** 
(4.094) 
0.005* 
(1.656) 
AGE 0.0001 
(0.908)  
0.0001 
(0.436) 
0.0002 
(1.253) 
0.0000 
(0.101) 
0.0000 
(0.255) 
0.0001 
(0.562)  
-0.0002** 
(-2.117)  
-0.0003 
(-1.416) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.888) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.431) 
-0.0002** 
(-1.987) 
-0.0002 
(-1.076) 
DEBT -0.039** 
(-2.189)  
-0.036*** 
(-2.929) 
-0.040*** 
(-3.450) 
-0.056*** 
(-6.711) 
-0.047*** 
(-3.326) 
-0.033* 
(-1.693)  
-0.131*** 
(-8.416)  
-0.114*** 
(-8.930) 
-0.062*** 
(-8.007) 
-0.078*** 
(-11.333) 
-0.096*** 
(-9.305) 
-0.118*** 
(-9.645) 
LIQUIDITY 0.049** 
(2.251)  
0.043*** 
(2.628) 
0.048*** 
(3.142) 
0.075*** 
(5.081) 
0.037** 
(2.046) 
0.006 
(0.229)  
0.061*** 
(5.284)  
0.046*** 
(3.107) 
0.022*** 
(3.238) 
0.036*** 
(5.207) 
0.052*** 
(3.691) 
0.052*** 
(3.024) 
INVENTORY -0.101*** 
(-3.838)  
0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.026 
(-1.602) 
-0.050*** 
(-2.856) 
-0.082 
(-3.595) 
-0.136*** 
(-3.664)  
-0.074*** 
(-5.847)  
-0.027 
(-1.178) 
-0.017** 
(-1.928) 
-0.030*** 
(-4.105) 
-0.066*** 
(-5.221) 
-0.089*** 
(-4.179) 
TURNOVER 0.177*** 
(10.273)  
0.067*** 
(8.567) 
0.0997*** 
(12.043) 
0.152*** 
(16.931) 
0.233*** 
(20.204) 
0.317*** 
(17.712)  
0.007 
(0.365)  
0.005 
(0.494) 
0.017*** 
(5.168) 
0.034*** 
(8.337) 
0.053*** 
(9.045) 
0.079*** 
(9.659) 
K/L -0.079*** 
(-5.485)  
-0.034*** 
(-3.432) 
-0.052*** 
(-6.660) 
-0.061*** 
(-7.773) 
-0.062*** 
(-6.440) 
-0.082*** 
(-5.070)  
-0.045*** 
(-3.698)  
-0.026*** 
(-3.265) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.771) 
-0.018*** 
(-4.491) 
-0.028*** 
(-4.827) 
-0.038*** 
(-4.986) 
FDI 0.087*** 
(3.665)  
0.005 
(0.291) 
0.019* 
(1.870) 
0.023 
(1.560) 
0.063** 
(2.297) 
0.181*** 
(2.750)  
0.009 
(0.828)  
-0.036* 
(-1.677) 
-0.008 
(-0.962) 
-0.001 
(-0.192) 
0.017 
(1.325) 
0.021 
(0.981) 
                
(Pseudo) R2 0.4842  0.1333 0.1820 0.2564 0.3407 0.4404  0.1632  0.0795 0.0512 0.1116 0.1846 0.2376 
Shapiro-Francia test 7.109        7.174       
                
Notes: t-values in parenthesis.  Based on t-values, *,  ** and *** mean that coefficients are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.   
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Table 5: Tests for the stability of the regression coefficients at selected quantiles. Boostrap t-tests were obtained from 1000 draws for each quantile. Country: Portugal 
Dependent variable: GROA 
Sample: 523 firms  
Dependent variable: NROA 
Sample: 523 firms 
 Equality of Quantile Regression Between:  Equality of Quantile Regression Between: 
Quantile 
Groups 
0.10 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.75 
0.90  
0.10 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.75 
0.90 
Variables          
GROWTH -2.267♦ -0.565 -0.597 0.563  -0.586 -1.224 -0.110 1.105 
R&D -0.781 -0.101 -0.015 0.829  -0.944 -0.480 0.623 0.164 
CR4 -0.474 1.932♦ -0.260 -0.084  0.533 -0.055 -0.530 0.332 
FSHARE 1.116 -0.431 0.125 0.722  0.815 0.525 -0.400 1.361 
SIZE -0.532 -1.183 0.942 -0.379  -1.248 -0.710 -1.127 -0.355 
AGE 1.505 0.095 -0.038 0.918  1.421 0.477 0.476 0.992 
DEBT 2.491♦ 0.817 0.634 1.043  2.368♦ 3.463♦ -0.781 0.344 
LIQUIDITY -1.173 -1.265 1.124 0.588  -1.383 -3.065♦ 0.753 0.317 
INVENTORY -1.106 -0.233 -0.133 -0.976  -1.121 -1.755♦ -0.395 -0.786 
TURNOVER 0.284 2.583♦ 2.668♦ 1.982♦  0.140 0.921 1.017 2.507♦ 
K/L -2.116♦ 0.361 -0.436 0.133  -2.295♦ -2.347♦ -1.024 0.490 
FDI 0.369 1.620 0.610 0.500  1.302 1.085 -0.040 1.614 
          
Legend: ♦ indicates a p-value ≤ 0.10.  
 22
Table 6: Tests for the stability of the regression coefficients at selected quantiles. Boostrap t-tests were obtained from 1000 draws for each quantile. Country: Greece 
Dependent variable: GROA 
Sample: 2651 firms  
Dependent variable: NROA 
Sample: 2651 firms 
 Equality of Quantile Regression Between:  Equality of Quantile Regression Between: 
Quantile 
Groups 
0.10 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.75 
0.90  
0.10 
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.75 
0.90 
Variables          
GROWTH 2.297♦ 1.967♦ 1.375 0.575  2.029♦ 1.769♦ 2.430♦ 1.503 
R&D 0.761 1.042 -0.841 -0.286  -0.889 0.297 3.108♦ 0.711 
CR4 0.286 2.166♦ 0.409 0.862  1.249 2.516♦ 1.538 2.384♦ 
FSHARE -0.184 0.714 -0.595 0.477  -1.016 0.958 -0.940 1.582 
SIZE -0.043 1.089 -0.870 0.909  -1.854♦ -0.830 1.574 -0.763 
AGE 0.767 -1.293 0.147 0.464  0.816 -0.116 -1.023 0.403 
DEBT -0.376 -1.617 0.724 0.771  5.044♦ -2.534♦ -2.358♦ -2.379♦ 
LIQUIDITY 0.293 2.011♦ -2.384♦ -1.428  -1.940♦ 2.306♦ 1.340 -0.013 
INVENTORY -1.438 -1.445 -1.573 -1.771♦  0.511 -1.639♦ -3.483♦ -1.365 
TURNOVER 4.537♦ 7.003♦ 8.906♦ 4.682♦  1.519 5.636♦ 4.190♦ 3.848♦ 
K/L -2.167♦ -1.296 -0.076 -1.392  1.296 -0.224 -2.014♦ -1.536 
FDI 1.053 0.311 1.790♦ 2.0 76♦  1.604 0.823 1.685♦ 0.224 
          
Legend: ♦ indicates a p-value ≤ 0.10.  
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